This study empirically attempts to unveil the contradictive fi ndings regarding the relationship between fi scal imbalances and infl ation in the context of the latest theoretical indications. The empirical analysis covers the period of 1970 to 2009 and applies dynamic panel techniques in a pool of 52 countries that comprises 19 developed and 33 developing ones. This segmentation is applied to illustrate the groups' specifi c features and the implications of heterogeneity. The fi ndings provide supportive evidence for developing countries. We also fi nd a signifi cant degree of heterogeneity between the groups and the statistical signifi cance of the relationship between fi scal imbalances and infl ation in the case of developed countries cannot be ratifi ed.
Introduction
One ever present topic of furious debate in macroeconomics has been the importance of the public budget balance towards a sustainable growth path. Economics has gone full circle, in the last century, on this topic, from the view of the Austrian school (Ludwig Heinrich von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek) regarding the negative effects of budget defi cits on growth, to Keynesian views and practises in the 1950s and 1960s, when public spending was conceived as a powerful tool to drive growth, and back to monetarist and neoclassical views about the destabilising infl ationary pressures they induce. These shifts in economic thought have been refl ected in various actions that were undertaken over the last decades, involving central bank independence all over the world, as well as the general trend towards fi scal austerity measures preached by institutions like the IMF and the WB to economies around the world. Economic unions have followed this trend with EU being the most obvious example. This trend was further enforced by monetarist economists who stretched the idea of the destabilising effect of the eventual monetisation of persistent defi cits as well as more recent developments which pointed to the effects on expectations and the different implications of the same effects on the output and unemployment gaps that defi cits may have. Consequently, it is a matter of major importance to thoroughly examine the existence of a possible causal link between fi scal imbalances and infl ation.
Initially dynamic panel methods are used to investigate a group of countries for an adequately long time span. Secondly, this paper takes into account possible heterogeneity effects among countries by separately considering developing and developed countries. Furthermore, to ensure the robustness of the obtained results we include other conditioning variables, namely monetary expansion, trade openness, oil price changes and demand. Monetary expansion is incorporated as an explanatory variable to better illustrate the channels through which budget defi cits may cause infl ationary pressures. This approach adds a new element to the on-going debate about the monetarist argument since it sheds more light on the channels through which fi scal imbalances can be empirically proven to affect infl ation. Theoretical claims that infl ationary effects cannot be examined separately from other signifi cant macroeconomic variables that affect the rate of change of prices are addressed by adding the other variables.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, the theoretical background for the relationship between fi scal imbalances and infl ation is examined while Section 3 builds upon the aforementioned theoretical background to derive a relationship that can be empirically tested. Section 4 describes the data that are used followed by Section 5, which illustrates in detail the econometric techniques used, the results obtained and presents a discussion on the empirical fi ndings. Finally Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
Theoretical Background
Hayek was the fi rst to criticize Keynesian approaches on the issue of public spending which was advocated as a tool for growth. According to Hayek (1966) Keynes made the erroneous assumption that "no scarcity exists." Hayek suggested that growth is actually supply constrained and unemployment can be conceived as a short-term outcome of economic agents' mistaken expectations. Thus, any efforts to stimulate the economy via public spending would be doomed to have negative effects especially on infl ation. Building on the same reasoning monetarist economists with Milton Friedman being the most prominent, used the natural or non-accelerating infl ation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) to support the same view even though that was later criticized (Vickrey, 1998; Smithin, 1996) .
After the relative demise of the Hayekian scarcity principle and the NAIRU, the view of the intertemporal budget constraint for the government has emerged which linked monetary and fi scal policy in three policy regimes.
1 These theories were the result of the trend towards an increased role of expectations in the formation of the LM curve. Three different policy regimes have been approached in the theoretical struggle to link fi scal imbalances and infl ation.
In the fi rst policy regime, fi scal policy is assumed to adjust to ensure that the government's intertemporal budget is always in balance while monetary policy is free to set the nominal money stock or the nominal rate of interest. This is called a Ricardian regime where monetary policy is dominating fi scal policy (Sargent and Wallace, 1981; Leeper, 1991) . Initially this model implied that in order to avoid infl ationary pressures, monetary policy has to dominate fi scal policy. Later theoretical postulations, however, indicated that even in that case, infl ation can be caused by the decisions about public spending (Walsh, 2003) through the effect on interest rates. (i.e. the Ricardian equivalence does not hold).
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The second policy regime is the one where the fi scal authorities exogenously determine their expenditure and taxes, thus being dominant over monetary targets (Sargent and Wallace, 1981; Rao Aiyagari and Gertler, 1985) . Accordingly if the present discounted value of these taxes is not enough to cover all expenditures then seigniorage must adjust to ensure that the government's intertemporal budget constraint is satisfi ed. In this case the empirical diffi culty 3 to link defi cits with the expansion of money supply was credited to the ability of the government to borrow and thus transfer the need to monetise, deeper in time (Sargent and Wallace, 1981) . However, under persistent defi cits seigniorage would eventually occur leading to infl ation.
Finally, the third policy regime, which is the most recently developed, is known as the fi scal theory of the price level (FTPL). Its main proponents being Woodford (1995) and Cochrane (Cochrane, 2001) suggested that in the context of a non-Ricardian environment fi scal defi cits will cause infl ation. This happens because fi scal solvency is ensured automatically through changes in price level rather than by government's actions. This regime was, however, heavily criticised by Buiter (2002) and McCallum (1999; on the basis of its theoretical foundation. 1 Sargent and Wallace (1981) and Sargent (1987) clearly illustrate the importance of the budget constraint for the analysis of monetary topics.
A balanced budget increase in expenditures that raises the real interest rate (since more taxes reduce available savings), raises the nominal interest rate and decreases the demand for money, thus given an exogenous path of the nominal money supply, infl ation will occur to decrease the real supply of money.
3 Friedman (1981) noted: "Put wartime periods aside, many other factors typically affect the rate of monetary growth, so that there is only the loosest relation in practise between monetary growth and defi cits" while Brunner (1969) observes that there are occurrences of infl ation without large budget defi cits and very large changes in defi cits with no visible effect on the broad behaviour of the economy and Meltzer (1976) extends that to even the case of hyperinfl ation periods using the example of Germany in the 1920s.
Opposed to the aforementioned theories came two post Keynesian schools of thought which viewed the role of defi cits in the economy totally differently. The monetary circuit approach as well as the neo-Chartalism monetary theory both criticised the mainstream monetary theory on the basis of the exogeneity of the monetary base that the latter accepted. Modern supporters of the monetary circuit approach (Graziani, 1989; Graziani, 2003; Bellofi ore, Davanzati, and Realfonzo, 2000; Nell, 2002) propose that defi cits should lead to infl ation regardless of whether they are monetized or not by making a distinction between hard and credit money. 4 Neo Chartalism proponents (Mitchell, 2009; Febrero, 2009; Wray, 2003) on the other hand argued for the endogeneity of money but traced its origins in public spending and defi cits and implied that they are vital to sustained growth. They also pointed to the fallacy of condemning any suggested infl ationary pressures that public spending and defi cits might create.
Deriving the Econometrical Expression
Whether someone uses a simple equation of exchange or the accelerationist Philips Curve or the new Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC), the result of fi scal activity on infl ation is the same.
To illustrate how fi scal expansion can affect infl ation employing the fi rst method we consider the simple form of the equation of exchange:
where M is the total amount of money in circulation in an economy V is velocity of money, that is the average frequency with which a unit of money is spent P is price level Q is real expenditure If we express the equation of exchange in terms of growth rates and considering, for matters of simplicity, V as constant, 5 then:
4 This is a direct critique against the argument of Sargent and Wallace (1982) about governments avoiding infl ation due to lending.
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Besides the weaknesses in the very nature of the term "monetary velocity" assuming a constant velocity of money in a dynamic analysis provides a good trade-off of simplicity versus robustness since the speed of money does not present a causal factor of prices. As Drewry (1968) puts it: "Increased velocity of circulation is not, in itself, even a contributing cause of higher commodity prices. It is not even a link in the chain of causation. Increased velocity of circulation and higher commodity prices are joint results of a change in the value of money in relation to the value of goods." Thus eliminating V from an equation whose purpose is to examine the causal relationship between public budget defi cits and the change in the consumer price index does not create drawbacks.
That is to say, if V is constant, then the infl ation rate would exactly equal the growth rate of the monetary base minus the growth of output.
Consequently, modelling defi cit in line with the Hayekian and monetarist arguments we have:
where PBL is the public budget balance, G represents the total public expenditure (including interest payments on public debt) , T represents taxes and ΔΒ is the change in the stock of government debt held by the public while ΔZ is the change in the stock of government debt held by the central bank. The change in the stock of government debt, ΔZ, held by the central bank when positive (negative) represents a monetary expansion (contraction) can be equal or smaller than the total change in the monetary base as shown in equation (4):
By substituting (4) into (3), then solving for ΔΜ and replacing the result into (2) we get equation (5):
This means that infl ation is positively affected by an increase in the public defi cit and negatively affected by an increase in the amount of debt owned by the private sector as well as by an increase in output growth. In case ΔQ is 0, due to the scarcity suggestion (Hayek, 1966) , and since ΔB will eventually become 0 due to the argument of Sargent and Wallace (1981) then at that point infl ation will be determined only by the term (T-G)/M, where T-G is the public budget balance.
Using the second method, namely the accelerationist Philips Curve suggests that infl ation is an outcome of the unemployment gap and previous infl ation rate as in (6):
Thus infl ation is negatively correlated with deviations of the unemployment rate U (which is affected by government spending) from its natural rate U* Thirdly, the new Keynesian Phillips Curve suggests that infl ation is a function of next period's expected infl ation rate 1 t t P E P   , the output gap and an additive disturbance x t as in (7):
In this case, fi scal expansion affects all, expected infl ation, the output gap and the additive disturbance and it is expected to have a quantitatively positive infl uence on infl ation.
From the above, it becomes clear that all three theoretical approaches reach the same conclusion, namely that fi scal expansion (contraction) increases (decreases) infl ation. Thus an empirical investigation should be focused on testing whether θ (in equation (8) that follows) can be found to be negative and statistically signifi cant:
where θ is the coeffi cient of change of infl ation to an 1% increase of the government budget balance. If the postulations by the aforementioned theories are correct it should be found signifi cant and negative.
Data
It is expected that the effects of budget defi cits on infl ation vary across countries with different characteristics, such as different levels of fi nancial development, infl ation rates, levels of openness and institutions. This fact implies the existence of signifi cant heterogeneity in the composition of our data set. Furthermore, when testing long-run equilibrium relationships a suffi ciently long and uninterrupted time series data set is needed. Additionally it is important to include variables from all possible channels (demand, supply, monetary, fi scal etc.) through which infl ation is affected to eliminate missing variable bias.
The data set in this study satisfi es all the aforementioned conditions. In the case of our panel regressions it comprises of 52 countries, 19 developed and 33 developing 6,7 for which no less than 30 years of continuous annual observations on our variables exist, starting from 1970 till 2009.
The fi scal balance measure used is the nominal surplus of the central government as reported in the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) International Financial Statistics (IFS) which includes transfers and net interest payments and is measured on a cash basis. Besides being the only viable choice of defi cit measurement for a large pool of countries, it is also the one that most previous studies on the topic use. 8 As a measure of monetary expansion we use the broad money expansion rate provided by the same database (i.e. IFS).
9 It has been argued in the past, and is now generally accepted, that the proper measure of monetary expansion that affects infl ation is not 6 The classifi cation of developed and developing economies is taken from IMF's World Economic Outlook.
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A list of the selected countries is given in the Appendix.
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This measure is subject to two limitations: fi rstly, it can be a misleading indicator of changes in real government debt (regardless of whether it is scaled by GDP or current money stock) in periods of hyperinfl ation; and secondly it fails to incorporate local governments, public enterprises, and central bank losses which play a signifi cant role in infl ationary episodes in some countries. However, such a broader measure does not exist for most countries for a suffi cient time span.
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This includes less liquid assets than currency in circulation such as transferable deposits, savings deposits, traveller's checks securities other than shares electronic money etc. (IMF 2000) .
currency in circulation and bank reserves but also less liquid but still easily transformed to currency assets (Seccareccia and Sood, 2000) . As already noted in the literature review, the most common cause of infl ation by neoclassical economists and monetarists is the eventual monetisation of the defi cit. Sargent and Wallace (1981) , illustrated in their equilibrium modelling process that persistent defi cits (higher than growth rates) will eventually have to be monetized as the public's demand for government debt has a limit and the central bank will have to print money to buy government bonds. However, the effect of an expansion of the monetary base can be accompanied by a contraction of a higher measure of money due to, for instance, a possible reduction in credit available etc. For that purpose we use the broad money rate of change as the best count of money supply in the exchange equation (as noted in Part 3).
Infl ation is proxied by the annual percentage change of the consumer price index also found in IMF's IFS databank.
For a supply variable our initial efforts were in gathering labour cost data. However, such data is only available for developed countries and very few developing ones. This would forbid a comparative analysis between the two groups of countries so we resort to using oil price changes to examine the effects of higher production costs. Oil price is a well-known source of infl ationary pressures in the world economy since, when oil cost increases so do production costs and prices of goods follow leading to infl ation. Data was collected from the International Energy Agency's (IEA) Energy Prices and Taxes database. Observations report import prices per barrel of crude oil for each country. For the few cases of countries that data was not available, the area average was used. Most studies in the past use a universal measure of the oil price thus excluding different country specifi c effects. By using the import prices we are able to not just incorporate a supply cost measure but also make it country specifi c by including other factors that might explain industrial costs in country.
As a demand side variable we use a measure of Demand. Observations on fi nal demand are readily available in the AMECO database, but only for developed countries. Thus we constructed a demand measure adding private and public consumption and gross fi xed capital formation. Data were taken from IMF's IFS database.
Following Catao and Terrones (2005) , we include one control variable in our model, namely trade openness, measured by the sum of exports and imports over GDP. Data for trade openness come from IMF's IFS. Trade openness, as argued by Romer (1993) and Lane (1997) , determines how monetary expansion affects infl ation. First the weight of the home goods sector will be smaller in a more open economy implying that the effect of monetary expansion on domestic employment (which affects infl ation) will be also smaller, and secondly the currency depreciation resulting from a monetary expansion will raise domestic infl ation by more than in a closed economy. Hence, the more open the economy is the less time-inconsistent the monetary policy, implying a negative relationship between openness and infl ation.
Gaps in the data were fi lled, where available, from IMF's World Economic Outlook and ECOFIN's AMECO 10 database. The resulting data set comprises of a lightly unbalanced 11 panel of 1517 observations for a sample of 52 countries, including both developed and developing ones, over the period . So far to the knowledge of the writers, no such a wide range of infl ation determinants has been included in empirical panel analyses.
Furthermore, as was mentioned previously, the panel is divided into two groups, developed and developing, in order to gain more insight accounting for heterogeneity among countries. Table 1 , reports some of the main descriptive measures of the examined series, reporting averages of the relevant ratios by country groups and decade long sub-periods. 
Methodological Issues and Empirical Results
The fi rst step in panel data estimation is to determine the appropriate econometric specifi cation, discriminating between developed and developing countries to gain more insight on the heterogeneity issue among them. Usually, the choice of the appropriate specifi cation lies among the following three simple panel formulations, namely the pooled OLS, the Fixed Effects (FEM) and the Random Effects (REM) model.
We started by testing for omitted country and time specifi c effects by means of a Breusch and Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test. The results, reported in Table 2 below, reject the null hypothesis of absence of both time specifi c and country specifi c effects, at the 1% level, revealing that a pooled regression is inappropriate in our case.
We next tested whether a REM or a FEM specifi cation seems to be the most appropriate using the Hausman test (1978) . In order to conclude in favour of a REM specifi cation as our model, the individual effects must not be correlated with the regressors. In case this assumption does not hold the REM will be inconsistently estimated and we have to choose the FEM. The results, reported in Table 2 , suggest that we can reject the null at the 1% signifi cance level except the case of developed countries where it cannot be rejected. Since the assumption of no correlation is violated in the other cases, we adopt the FEM as our primary estimation model for the panels of all countries and developing countries and the REM for developed countries.
We then performed diagnostic tests for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Starting with the assumption of homoscedasticity we fi rst apply an LR test. The results reject the null of homoscedasticity so the GLS estimation procedure seems more appropriate to account for this problem with the condition that no autocorrelation exists. 12 Wooldridge (2002) derives a simple test for autocorrelation in panel-data models. 13 The results of the test in our case indicate the existence of autocorrelation. To deal with the problem of autocorrelation, it is required to explore the possibility that the autocorrelation arises due to model miss-specifi cation. To face this problem a new dynamic panel data model (DPDM), is specifi ed by adding a lagged endogenous variable as follows:
Inf i,t = α t +γInf i,t-1 +βSur i,t +η i +u i,t (9) where Inf are the observations of infl ation and Sur the observations for the public Surplus both denoted for county i at time t.
The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable introduces a source of persistence over time, due to the correlation between the lagged regressor and the error term ui,t. Another problem is that, DPDMs are characterised by individual effects ηi caused by heterogeneity among the individuals. Thus, we use the GMM estimator which is known as the difference estimator and was proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) . The estimation method eliminates country and time specifi c effects (ηi) by expressing Equation (9) in fi rst differences as follows:
on the basis of the following standard moment condition:
E(ΔInf i,t-s Δu i,t ) = 0, for t = 3,…, N and s ≥ 2.
However, there seems to be a problem with it since Blundell and Bond (1998) state that the GMM estimator obtained after fi rst differencing has been found to have large fi nite sample bias and poor precision 14 . Consequently, they have proposed an extended, more effi cient and more consistent generalized method of moments estimation (GMM) for DPDMs based on the following moment condition:
where Δ is the fi rst difference operator.
Therefore, the extended GMM encompasses a regression equation in both differences and levels, each one with its specifi c set of instrumental variables. This type of system estimation method, not only improves the precision but also reduces the fi nite sample bias. The model assumes that the disturbances u i,t are not serially correlated. If this is the case, there should be evidence of fi rst order serial correlation in differenced residuals (i.e. Δu i,t ), but no evidence of second order serial correlation (Doornik, Arellano and Bond, 2002) . The above assumption is important because the consistency of the GMM estimators hinges upon the fact that E[Δu i,t Δu i,t-2 ] = 0. Thus, testing the fi rst-differenced residuals for autocorrelation up to second order is required. Additionally, by using the two steps GMM we get theoretically robust standard errors and subsequently we can 14 They attribute these problems to the weakness of the lagged levels of the series to provide instruments for the fi rst difference.
apply the Windmeijer (2005) correction in order to guarantee that the standard errors are not downward biased due to the relatively limited number of countries (Roodman, 2007) . Furthermore, over-identifying restrictions tests are also reported based on the Hansen J statistic which is the minimized value of the two-step GMM criterion. This method uses lagged differences of the endogenous variables as instruments for equations in levels, in addition to lagged levels of infl ation as instruments for equations in fi rst differences.
The results of the aforementioned regression and tests are shown in Table 3 : Table 3 GMM System Results Notes: -* indicates signifi cance at 10% level, ** indicates signifi cance at 5% level and *** indicates signifi cance at 1% level.
Infl ation Inertia

-Standard errors in parentheses, -p-values in brackets
To summarise, the dynamic panel data GMM system estimator results (Table 3) indicate that the relationship between the fi scal balance and infl ation, is negative and statistically signifi cant only for developing countries. More specifi cally a 1% point deterioration on the government balance of developing countries raises the infl ation rate by 0.17% while in the case of developed countries the coeffi cient suggests that the effect of an 1 percentage point increase in the budget defi cit causes a 0.009% increase in infl ation which is, however, statistically insignifi cant.
Looking at the additional variables that aim at providing robustness to the model we note that the coeffi cients on trade openness have the theoretically expected signs in all cases and are found signifi cant for both developing and developed countries. However, the magnitudes of the coeffi cients differ between the two groups (-0.02 and -0.005 for developing and developed ones, respectively). The difference indicates that at lower levels of openness (developing economies) an economy experiences larger changes in infl ation from a change in trade openness as opposed to economies with high trade openness percentages (developed economies). Thus fi ndings seem to support the argument of Terra (1998) and Bleaney (1999) , that the effects of trade openness on infl ation are group specifi c.
Oil price infl ation is found signifi cant both for developed countries and for developing countries as being expected and furthermore the coeffi cients between the two groups of countries are very similar (0.03 and 0.02) indicating that oil prices affect both groups in the same way. However, this matter is outside the boundaries of the present endeavour and thus will not be further explored.
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Infl ation inertia is found to be statistically signifi cant in both cases in accordance to Chopra (1985) , with a much higher coeffi cient for developed countries (0.7) in comparison to 0.18 for developing ones. The much lower volatility of infl ation rates that are observed in developed countries can explain the aforementioned results as more of the previous year's infl ation is carried over to the next one due to a more consistent infl ation targeting strategy by their monetary institutions.
Furthermore, the inclusion of demand's annual rate of change provides homogenous results for both groups. A 1% change in demand generates 0.30% of infl ation for developed countries and 0.33% for developingoues. It is important here to note that demand is the largest infl ation determinant in both developing and developed countries.
On the other hand, monetary expansion seems to be signifi cant (at the 10% and 5% confi dence intervals) in determining infl ation in developed and developing economies.
As is often erroneously expected, budget defi cits that cause infl ation should do so by seigniorage mainly, so fi nding a causal relationship between infl ation and defi cits should imply the existence of a relationship between defi cits and monetary expansion in the fi rst stage and monetary expansion and infl ation in the second. The fi ndings of this study indicate that this might be more complicated in practise, defi cits are not found to be signifi cantly connected with infl ation but monetary expansion is in the case of developed countries. Since fi scal imbalances do not statistically infl uence monetary expansion in auxiliary regressions we are led to conclude that the argument of Sargent and Wallace of the eventual monetisation of defi cits does not hold.
As for developing countries, our results seem to agree with a number of Nordhausapproach studies that have elaborated on the link between monetary expansion and fi scal imbalances. Bates (1988) Durevall and Ndung'u (2001) report the case of Kenya. Krueger and Turan (1993) describe expenditure policy cycles around elections in Turkey in the 1950-1980 period. Calvo and Mendoza (1996) mention that the Mexican crisis partly resulted from the signifi cant increase in the quasi-fi scal defi cit (associated with the extension of credit, e.g. through development banks) before the elections in 1994. This also lays support to the argument that developing countries have curtailed their infl ation rates thanks to the more "responsible" monetary policies undertaken with the guidance from international institutions like the IMF and the World Bank over the last decades.
Finally, the evidence (Table 3) on the relationship between fi scal imbalances and infl ation seems to be puzzling, to say the least. In developed economies, there is no 15 See Le Blanc & Chin (2004) for a further discussion of this topic.
statistically signifi cant evidence for the relationship between the two variables, while in developing economies the opposite happens. Catao and Terrones (2005) also fi nd similar evidence in a study on the determinants of infl ation. Our study once again seems to support the argument that the nature of the examined relationship may differ between different groups and even between different countries pointing to the fact that groups of countries have to be examined separately since a disproportionate weight of one group may bias the results. An 1% point change in the fi scal balance causes a 0.17% change in the rate of infl ation, in the opposite direction in developing economies while the relationship is not statistically signifi cant for developed countries.
Accordingly, it seems that there must be a set of characteristics that allow countries to manage their intertemporal budget constraint more effi ciently than others and thus weaken infl ationary pressures. Canzoneri et al. (2001) , suggest that these are the following: a) well established institutions that curb fi scal profl igacy, b) central banks that are committed to low infl ation and c) deep fi nancial markets. These three characteristics may be the reason why increases in fi scal defi cits (or their reduction) do not increase (decrease) the rate of infl ation. Coupled with the persistent defi cits that are witnessed by almost all developed countries, we are led to conclude that governments do not have to monetise their debt eventually, as the argument of Sargent and Wallace would suggest. One explanation of that could be the possible endogeneity of money which is in line with the circuit approach (Seccareccia and Sood, 2000) . Additionally, expectations also seem to not fuel infl ation in the presence of fi scal imbalances in developed countries. Established institutions and fi nancial development in advanced economies have achieved to reduce expectations of future infl ation that could in turn cause infl ation in times of negative fi scal balances and thus pressures in the general price level have been avoided.
Conclusions
This paper has attempted to examine the relationship between fi scal imbalances and infl ation and to illustrate the differences of the underlying attributes in theory and practise by accounting for the implications of heterogeneity.
In the context of the empirical analysis, this study applied dynamic panel econometric methods on a pool of 52 countries over the period from 1970 to 2009. The results provided rather limited support for the theoretical postulations. More particularly even though the expected negative relationship between infl ation and the public budget balance is empirically confi rmed for developing countries, the same does not hold for the case of developed countries.
More specifi cally, for the group of developing countries, fi scal imbalances have been identifi ed as the primary causal determinant of infl ation as compared to inertia, demand side, supply side, monetary, and trade openness variables that have all been found statistically signifi cant.
For the group of developed countries, the empirical link between the two variables (i.e. infl ation and budget defi cits) cannot be verifi ed. The arguments of monetarists do not seem to hold and this could be due to various factors. A commitment to fi scal profl igacy in conjunction with the stability of their currencies might be signifi cant in sustaining the price level. Secondly, the increased fi nancial deepening and independent monetary authorities prevent fi scal imbalances to raise general prices. Thirdly, governments and institutions in advanced economies cultivate positive expectations in economic agents about the future stability of the economy, and thus avoid unnecessary expectationtriggered infl ation pressures.
As a result, developing countries have to anticipate infl ationary shocks after fi scal balance shocks have occurred. Besides that, fi scal imbalances seem to be the main explanatory factor of infl ation as compared to the other macroeconomic variables.
A further important conclusion of this study is the fact that heterogeneity, if not accounted for, may lead to wrong conclusions. Both developed and developing countries should be examined separately and researchers should be very critical when grouping countries with heterogeneous characteristic in order to examine theoretical postulations.
